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Introduction 5 
When practitioners and experts of foreign policy speak of “geopolitical change,” it is typically in 6 
reference to certain geographical features gaining or losing influence over the course of 7 
international relations and global politics. Such thinking is part of a tradition of classical 8 
geopolitical thought (hereafter Geopolitics) dating back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth 9 
centuries.1 From this perspective, the dominant feature of Geopolitics in the Arctic being sea ice 10 
(indeed the very idea of the Arctic as a fixed and knowable quantity) was for a long time taken 11 
for granted. Before and during much of the Cold War, sea ice was widely regarded as a barrier to 12 
the interests and activities that nation-states might seek to pursue in the region, whether 13 
searching for resources, trade routes, or encounters with the sublime. As a geopolitical stage, the 14 
Arctic was thus largely separated (in geopolitical terms) from the rest of the world, despite 15 
increasing scientific, military, and economic activity during the twentieth century. Eventually, 16 
this was viewed as an opportunity: A speech by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 marked the Arctic as 17 
a different kind of geopolitical stage, one where nation-state activity was defined more in terms 18 
of international cooperation and institution building instead of conflict. However, in the early 19 
twenty-first century, with Arctic sea ice thinning more and more each summer, a number of 20 
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commentators expect the behavior of nation-states to “revert to form.”2 They argue that the 1 
essential features of the international system are extending into the Arctic; what was once 2 
regarded as a different kind of geopolitical stage, due to the presence of sea ice, is being brought 3 
back into line with the “natural laws” of the international system.  4 
“Critical” Geopolitics has, since the 1980s, sought to challenge Geopolitics by 5 
reconceptualizing  it as a “discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spacialize’ 6 
international politics and represent it as a ‘world’ characterised by particular types of places, 7 
peoples and dramas.”3 Geopolitics is treated as a “problematic set of discourses, representations, 8 
and practices” in order to expose the ways geographical knowledge is used to justify relations of 9 
power between “selves” and “others”—relations that are subsequently reinforced and legitimated 10 
through a range of texts, images, performances, and practices.4 The perceived openness of the 11 
Arctic and indeterminacy of geographical space in general is thus read by Critical Geopolitics as 12 
suggestive of a vulnerability to enrollment not just in various state-building projects (most 13 
prominently in Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark/Greenland, and the United States), but also in 14 
schematics for how international relations should be orchestrated (in the Arctic, this is centered 15 
largely on the privileges of a combination of the five Arctic Ocean littoral states, the eight Arctic 16 
states, indigenous peoples groups, and the Arctic Council). The term vulnerability is important 17 
here, as it implies that the Arctic (and geographical space more broadly) is powerless to resist the 18 
ways in which it is put to use as a stage for geopolitical machinations. 19 
Thus, in both “cClassical” and “Critical” formulations of geopolitics, geography 20 
essentially provides the stage on which various political dramas can unfold. In the former, the 21 
stage is relatively stable, resting on claims about enduring and objectively knowable 22 
geographies, which naturally direct the course of international relations and global affairs. In the 23 
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latter, the stage is still relatively stable, but direction comes from how vulnerable geographies are 1 
invested with meaning and used to justify certain power relations by human actors occupying the 2 
stage. This has led a number of geographers to ask, “What does the ‘geo’ in ‘geo-politics’ 3 
actually do?”—the point being to consider whether there is more that the “geo” does than simply 4 
constitute the stage for human “politics,” and more specifically in the case of this chapter, what 5 
this “geo-power” would mean for how we approach the geopolitics of the Arctic in the early 6 
twenty-first century.5  7 
The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on the concept of geopower rooted in the work 8 
of the feminist philosopher Elizabeth Grosz.6 Moreover, the chapter takes a cue from feminist 9 
geographers who have sought to bring a feminist geopolitical analytic to CGeopolitics with the 10 
aim of “adding a potentially reconstructive political dimension to the crucial but at times 11 
unsatisfactory deconstructionist impulses.”7 However, rather than use the materiality of the 12 
human body, “not fully produced by or absorbed into discourse, to forge a space for a feminist, 13 
non-essentialist notion of ‘political,’” my concern here is to consider the potential of using the 14 
only ever partially realized materiality of the earth as a starting point for seeing the geopolitical 15 
differently. The point is that Hyndman’s call for feminist geopolitics (and Critical Geopolitics 16 
more broadly) to displace and resituate geopolitical scripts “in order to foreground the security of 17 
people on the ground” can be assisted by attending to how the ground itself is encountered as a 18 
never fully realized stage.8  19 
Geopower 20 
Elizabeth Grosz, renowned feminist, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail, a formative figure in Critical 21 
Geopolitics, both use the term geopower in a way that belies a shared concern for “geo-politics.” 22 
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For Ó Tuathail (drawing on Foucault), geopower concerns the way in which human actors use 1 
the relationship between power and geographical knowledge to produce and manage physical 2 
space (for example, through institutionalized or taken-for-granted ways of seeing, displaying, 3 
and marking the earth). Ó Tuathail argues that with the emergence of a world of “closed space” 4 
at the end of the nineteenth century, when there was virtually nothing left of value to discover or 5 
occupy, geopower became Geopolitics: “governmentalized forms of geographical knowledge” 6 
expressed in universal terms.9 As such, Geopolitics must be regarded as an overdetermined form 7 
of “geo-politics,” in which the unnamed practices that make Geopolitics possible are hidden 8 
from view.10  9 
Grosz’s use of geopower is markedly different. While in Ó Tuathail's account geopower 10 
marks a human force over the earth, for Grosz geopower refers to earthly forces that are 11 
entangled and interfere (precede, enable, provoke, and restrict) with life in all its forms, whether 12 
human or nonhuman. For Grosz, life both emerges from and capitalizes upon these forces, 13 
transforming “the world into its world.”11 Our understanding of the world around us thus rests on 14 
both an encounter with the world and a capitalization of that encounter, which attempts to 15 
reconfigure the world on our own terms. However, in the process of attempting to reconfigure 16 
the world, new conditions emerge for how the world is encountered, producing new 17 
combinations and new modes of organization and understanding that ultimately transform life 18 
itself. Thus, as life and earth continue to mingle, new forces are unleashed that provoke and 19 
incite new forms of life by “generating problems, questions and events that must be addressed 20 
and negotiated, symbolised or left unrepresented.”12 For Grosz, geopower is therefore always 21 
provoking life to overcome itself, to vary itself and to change across space and time: “The 22 
natural is not the inert, passive, unchanging element against which culture elaborates itself but 23 
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the matter of the cultural, that which enables and actively facilitates cultural variation and 1 
change, indeed that which ensures that the cultural, including its subject-agents, are never 2 
self-identical, that they differ from themselves and necessarily change over time.”13 3 
The perpetual push of Grosz’s geopower works against the negentropy of geopolitical 4 
practices that attempt to fix geographical fixtures in space and time, either to determine their 5 
influence over international relations and global affairs or to invest them with meaning. 6 
Negentropy describes emergent levels of organization where each level builds upon the achieved 7 
orderings of the preceding level and provides the ground for the next level to emerge. Successive 8 
orders are thus reliant on what has gone before and put to use in what comes after.14 To illustrate 9 
this crudely, we might consider how the contemporary international system is not an enduring 10 
ordering of international relations but an emerging order that has evolved from the Cold War, 11 
which itself evolved out of  World War II, and so on. Although these historical divisions are 12 
somewhat arbitrary, the point is to emphasize that wherever the dividing lines are drawn, certain 13 
elements (such as geopolitical tropes about the ongoing civilizational conflict between the 14 
“West” and the “Axis of Evil”) may become so pervasive that they influence the shape of what 15 
follows. In building on past relations among various elements, the negentropy of geopolitical 16 
practices is working constantly to close down the possibility of alternative orderings and 17 
constrains political debate. Geopower opens up such alternatives.  18 
Grosz’s work draws heavily on the writings of Charles Darwin (as opposed to Social 19 
Darwinism) as well as Michel Foucault, who has also been influential in Critical Geopolitics. As 20 
Grosz notes, both retained “[a] fundamental commitment to the intangibility of the hold of 21 
domination and its ongoing and transforming susceptibility to resistance and realignment by 22 
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virtue of the very forms of distribution or patterning that power itself takes…domination remains 1 
precariously dependent on what occurs not only ‘above’ but also ‘below.’”15  2 
The implication for Geopolitics, we might infer, is that the seemingly enduring features 3 
of the geopolitical stage are always dependent on the ongoing subordination of earthly forces 4 
“below”: forces that constantly recombine with life in ways that threaten to reconstitute the 5 
geopolitical itself. As in Ó Tuathail's account, Geopolitics may be posited as an overdetermined 6 
form of geopolitics. The difference between Grosz and Ó Tuathail is that in Grosz’s case, the 7 
hidden practices that make Geopolitics possible are found in a common realm where life (human 8 
and nonhuman) and earth are intermingled, rather than in an exclusively human social realm. 9 
Geopolitics might therefore usefully be (re)conceptualized as an attempt to arrest geopower 10 
(earthly forces) and subordinate it to the power of people (for example, foreign policy 11 
practitioners) or things (for example, enduring geographical features). Such a 12 
(re)conceptualization would also draw attention to the capacity of the “geo” to subvert or resist 13 
dominant forms of power, forcing us to reconsider whether the material world is as vulnerable to 14 
geopolitical machinations as Critical Geopolitics suggests, with the implication that earthly 15 
forces are taken more seriously as constituents in the production of the geopolitical, without 16 
returning to the geographical determinism associated with Geopolitics, classically formulated.  17 
Arctic Geopolitics 18 
In the early-twenty-first-century Arctic, Geopolitics remains highly prevalent in the texts, 19 
practices, and performances of foreign policy elites, political commentators, and the mainstream 20 
media, whether in North America, Europe, Russia, or Asia. In particular, the thinning of Arctic 21 
summer sea ice (the ten lowest minimum Arctic sea ice extents since the satellite record started 22 
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in 1979 have all occurred since 2007) has one way or another been described as an opening up of 1 
the Arctic. Geographical features (sea ice, water columns, continental shelves, and sea beds), 2 
which were once literally frozen or partly frozen, are being held responsible for determining the 3 
course of international relations in the region. According to the worst-case scenario, the decline 4 
of sea ice threatens to engulf the Arctic in resource scrambles and armed conflict unless law and 5 
order are imposed, either by Arctic nation-states or, more broadly, the international community. 6 
Such accounts are girded by an “uneasy synthesis between liberalism and neo-realism,” where 7 
the existence of the Arctic as an objectively knowable space—its essential features and 8 
exceptionalisms—and the practices and interests of nation-states and other actors are largely 9 
taken for granted.16 However, in presupposing the existence of the Arctic as a stage for these 10 
machinations, both the labor and the provocations posed by the humans and nonhumans involved 11 
in assembling the Arctic-as-stage are hidden from view, constraining the possibility of providing 12 
alternative geopolitical accounts of change and the possibilities of life in the Arctic more 13 
broadly. 14 
Assembling the Arctic Stage 15 
“Stage making” has long been at the heart of classical geopolitical thought. As Ó Tuathail noted, 16 
the West continues to retain a will to survey the world in order to sight (recognize and render 17 
space visible), site (delimit global political space), and cite (judge and textualize place) the 18 
realities of global political space.17 Foreign policy experts and practitioners attempt to simplify 19 
and stabilize the global stage in such a way that the actions of nation-states may appear rational. 20 
However, stage making is an ongoing process, one that continually provokes and incites further 21 
kinds of encounters between earth and life while at the same time trying to contain potential 22 
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outcomes: “to slow them, to put them in service of life's [in this case the nation-state's] 1 
provisional interests.”18  2 
Contrary to the expectations of Geopolitics, the Arctic-as-stage is therefore far from a 3 
permanent reality waiting to be discovered or, in the case of Critical Geopolitics, invested with 4 
meaning. The Arctic-as-stage is a specific ordering of life and earth, and as such is constituted 5 
from a common realm of both human and nonhuman elements including, but not limited to, sea 6 
ice, sea beds, water columns, continental shelves, mineral resources, and myriad different plants 7 
and animals as well as people and their various technologies, institutions, interests, and fantasies. 8 
As such, the Arctic-as-stage might more usefully be conceptualized as an “assemblage” of life 9 
and earth.  10 
The term assemblage is ill-defined in the social sciences, owing to the diversity with 11 
which it has been deployed by various scholars. However, within geography, the term has 12 
generally been used to encourage us to be “deliberately open as to the form of unity, its 13 
durability, the types of relations and the human and non-human elements involved.”19 More 14 
specifically, as geographers Ben Anderson and Colin McFarlane argue, the term seeks to account 15 
for four relational processes: the coming together, realigning, and/or dispersal of various 16 
elements at specific junctures in space and time; the distribution of agency across multiple 17 
elements within a collective; the ongoing emergence rather than resultant formation of 18 
assemblages; and the provisionality with which elements gather and disperse.20 19 
Significantly, assemblages direct attention toward processes of territorialization and 20 
deterritorialization, or what I here refer to as stage (un)making. Assemblages always attempt to 21 
“claim” territory from combinations of earth and life as parts are gathered, marked, and held 22 
together. However, this territory can also collapse as the same parts recombine or disperse, 23 
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ultimately leading, in this case, to the reterritorialization of the stage in novel ways. Stage 1 
making in Geopolitics is simultaneously an attempt to capitalize upon and bracket out this 2 
process of assembly. 3 
To describe the assembly of an Arctic “stage” is thus to describe the coming together of 4 
heterogeneous forms of earth and life into a provisional order. This assemblage, or 5 
stage-assemblage, is then used by experts and practitioners of Geopolitics to constrain the 6 
conditions under which further encounters occur as well as how they come to be known. The 7 
relative success of gGeopolitics is thus found in the way seemingly essential features of the 8 
international system (nation-states, anarchy) have remained central to assemblages of Arctic 9 
geopolitics, while novel interactions involving indigenous peoples, transnational oil companies, 10 
and environmental NGOs—as well as ecosystems, ice, and the global climate—have been 11 
suppressed, despite their importance to how change in the Arctic is encountered, managed, and 12 
understood by practitioners and experts of foreign policy.21 Crucially, this staging of Arctic 13 
geopolitics—that is, the conditions provided by the stage—has been used to justify the privileges 14 
of Arctic states to dictate the terms of Arctic governance according to a specific understanding of 15 
the international system that excludes other actors (indigenous people, non-Arctic states), the 16 
most recent being the Ilulissat Declaration signed by the five Arctic coastal states (Canada, 17 
Russia, Norway, Denmark, and the United States) in 2008. At the same time, such accounts 18 
reinforce the negentropy of geopolitical practice and close down the possibility of alternative 19 
orderings of Arctic geopolitics.  20 
The Demands of Geopower in the Arctic 21 
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The negentropy in Geopolitics is part of the hidden, unnamed workings of geopolitics—what Ó 1 
Tuathail calls a convenient fiction—that suppresses accounts of novel encounters between life 2 
and earth driven by geopower (earthly forces) in order that they might be displaced by more 3 
conventional understandings of the essential features of international relations and global 4 
politics.22 However, what Elizabeth Grosz argues is that there are some forces of geopower that 5 
Geopolitics must always respond to: the forward drift of time, the force of variation and 6 
proliferation of natural differences, and relations between the self and others.23 These forces 7 
provoke and incite responses from geopolitics by “generating problems, questions, events that 8 
must be addressed and negotiated, symbolized or left unrepresented.”24 They create moments 9 
where gGeopolitics is exceeded by a geo-politics that has been brought into the open, however 10 
temporarily. It is in these moments that the geopolitical stage is subject to change.  11 
The Forward Drift of Time 12 
The Arctic is far from an unchanging, enduring stage where Geopolitics plays out. This may 13 
sound surprising, since for more than 2,500 years the Arctic has appeared relatively stable from a 14 
Western (nonindigenous) perspective. However, there are at least four factors that have helped 15 
produce and maintain this assumption about the relative stability of the Arctic stage in Western 16 
history.  17 
The first factor is that over the period that explorers from Pytheas (320 BC) to Peary 18 
(1909) “discovered” the Arctic, from a geological perspective the Arctic has changed very 19 
little.25 According to data taken from ocean cores in the Arctic, the last major warm period (when 20 
the extent of summertime ice was likely less than it is today) in the region was 5,000–8,000 years 21 
ago. This is significant since it meant that despite warming events around AD 500 and 1500, the 22 
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major period of European and North American exploration from the seventeenth to the 1 
nineteenth centuries coincided with the Little Ice Age (circa 1600–1850), when ice conditions, 2 
particularly in the high Arctic, remained especially prohibitive to the navigational technologies 3 
of the period.26 Although there would have been variation over this period, overall, the Arctic 4 
that European (and later North American) explorers would have encountered (at least in terms of 5 
its most dominant geopolitical feature, sea ice) would have appeared relatively stable. Accounts 6 
producing the Arctic stage-assemblage as a barrier to (nonindigenous) human activity in the 7 
North were therefore largely uncontroversial throughout this period of discovery.  8 
The second factor was that the earth adjacent to the Arctic was also remarkably stable 9 
over this period. The earth that physically constitutes the Arctic is incredibly sensitive to changes 10 
in the earth that surrounds it (note that earth as it is used here includes the atmosphere and 11 
oceans). For much of the past two millennia, and again overlapping with the major period of 12 
European and North American exploration, there was relatively little variation in the earth 13 
surrounding the Arctic. The overall stability of the global climate, levels of pollution, and 14 
oceanic temperatures thus contributed to maintaining the stability of Arctic earth in geopolitical 15 
terms, since there was relatively little in the way of detectable shifts in the stage-assemblage 16 
(despite incidents such as the collapse of the seal population in the Bering Strait area in the 17 
1890s).  18 
The third factor was that for much of the 2,500-year period in question, the Arctic was 19 
encountered with only limited human technology, the effects of which were so localized that the 20 
overall stability of the earth constituting the Arctic was not significantly disrupted. Sea ice alone 21 
presented a formidable barrier to the wooden vessels that attempted to navigate passages around 22 
and through the Arctic Ocean, while the region itself was too distant to be significantly impacted 23 
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by pollution from the preindustrial centers of Europe. Despite the presence of highly mobile 1 
indigenous communities capable of traversing the ice, in the Western geopolitical imagination, 2 
the Arctic stage-assemblage was still regarded as an obstacle to (or, in the case of the English at 3 
least, an affront to—see below) human activities.  4 
Lastly (although there are likely other factors as well), there were limits to Western 5 
interest in the Arctic—limits to the imagination about what kind of place the Arctic could be. In 6 
the sixteenth century, sea routes from Europe to Asia were sought in the Arctic by the English 7 
and the Dutch in order to overcome Spanish and Portuguese naval dominance in the Atlantic 8 
Ocean. However, as noted above, they lacked the technology to overcome the Arctic they 9 
encountered in any significant way, and aspirations to turn the Arctic into a “polar 10 
Mediterranean” dissipated.27 By the nineteenth century, the Arctic was more a space of Western 11 
masculinist fantasy, in part linked to economic activities involving hunting for furs, whale oil, 12 
and baleen. Overcoming the Arctic for the most part meant surviving limited and highly 13 
localized encounters with what was increasingly regarded as a hostile space. For the English at 14 
least, the Arctic came to be seen as a sublime and monstrous space that threatened humanity to 15 
its core.28 Rumors of cannibalism among John Franklin and his crew fed fears of humans being 16 
consumed by nature in their encounters with the Arctic.29 However, while the Arctic 17 
stage-assemblage was invested with fantasy and fear, these ideas were not enough to physically 18 
transform the Arctic—if anything, they reinforced the stability of the Arctic-stage by 19 
discouraging further encounters. 20 
And yet, despite the relative stability of the Arctic stage-assemblage during this period, 21 
time continued to press on. By the end of the nineteenth century, encounters with the Arctic 22 
stage-assemblage were accelerating and intensifying in a variety of ways.30 Rapid 23 
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industrialization in the nineteenth century was accompanied by the development of new 1 
technologies and renewed fantasies, such as those of Vilhjalmur Stefansson about the Arctic as a 2 
potential polar Mediterranean and the northward course of empire, which to a lesser or greater 3 
extent have been sustained through the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As the global 4 
atmosphere has warmed, the earth around the Arctic has also changed, affecting atmospheric, 5 
oceanic, and cryospheric systems on a global scale. The diffusion of pollution from industrial 6 
development continues to alter the chemical composition of the earth that physically constitutes 7 
the Arctic. Sea ice, the dominant geopolitical feature of the Arctic stage-assemblage, is 8 
disappearing at an unprecedented rate as the ocean and atmosphere warm. All of these factors are 9 
implicated in further encounters between earth and life in the Arctic, a process that is also 10 
transforming life and earth beyond the Arctic. 11 
The Arctic, or more specifically, the earth constituting it (land, sea, ice, tundra, 12 
permafrost), is always physically changing over time, whether we consider it in terms of 13 
temperature, chemical composition, or state of matter (for example, gas, solid or liquid). This 14 
means that the stage, as an assemblage, is inherently unstable, shifting with changes in the 15 
physical condition of the earth. Time therefore provides an irresistible push to the future, forcing 16 
the stage-assemblage to constantly overcome itself as elements combine, shift, and recombine. 17 
However, as the above account has shown, although many of these changes may seem 18 
inconsequential to human affairs, over time they may drastically alter our perception of the kind 19 
of stage the Arctic represents. We see this today in claims that the Arctic Ocean is undergoing a 20 
fundamental state (stage) change from being permanently ice covered to seasonally ice free with 21 
tremendous implications for the kinds of lives (human and nonhuman) that can be lived there.31  22 
14 
 
Over time, the effectivity of individual elements within a stage-assemblage may also be 1 
overcome. For example, over time, the physical effects of the Little Ice Age during the Middle 2 
Ages on the extent of sea ice in the Arctic will become minimal as other elements in the 3 
stage-assemblage come to exert a greater influence. The loss of human effectivity is overcome 4 
through the creation of collective forms of organization that allow action and meaning to be 5 
sustained over time in the same way that a ball is passed in rugby in order to keep it moving (to 6 
use one of Bruno Latour’s metaphors).32 One way classical theories of geopolitics have been 7 
sustained over generations is through the teaching and dissemination of texts and practices 8 
among students. However, time poses a constant provocation to these geopolitical texts and 9 
practices because over time, the further intermingling of earth and life invariably exceeds the 10 
boundaries established by taken-for-granted geopolitical tropes. This excess is found in 11 
encounters with the stage-assemblage that undermine what has previously been taken for 12 
granted: encounters brought about by new technologies, new ideas, as well as changes in the 13 
environment both in and beyond the Arctic. This excess, brought about by change over time, is 14 
thus a resource that creates the space to rethink the stage-assemblage so that the Arctic is no 15 
longer regarded as an obstacle or a monstrous place but a knowable quantity where, for foreign 16 
policy practitioners and experts, the interests of nation-states (largely associated with nation 17 
building and economic activity) can be more easily pursued and justified, albeit in novel ways.  18 
The Force of Variation  19 
Life, both human and nonhuman, does not emerge from or encounter the earth that constitutes 20 
the Arctic in any prescribable fashion. Natural differences among various forms of life therefore 21 
pose a further provocation to geopolitics and the Arctic stage-assemblage. Variation propels life 22 
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toward a variety of encounters with the stage-assemblage, producing novel interactions that, like 1 
time, may exceed geopolitical discourses. For example, the relative success indigenous 2 
communities have had living in the Arctic over thousands of years contradicts long-standing 3 
Western assumptions about the inhospitability, if not hostility, of Arctic space, a situation that is 4 
now being reversed as novel forms of Western life (facilitated by new technology and new ideas 5 
combining to create an “urban Arctic”) and changes in the environment encounter the region and 6 
cause the stage-assemblage to shift, at times endangering indigenous lives in the process.  7 
The relative stability of the Arctic stage-assemblage (from a Western perspective) over 8 
the past 2,500 years owes much to the limited presence of nonindigenous peoples in the region 9 
that lasted into the twentieth century.33 It was not until the sixteenth century that the exploration 10 
of the Arctic even became an imperative for some emerging nation-states and their empires.34 11 
However, when it did become an imperative, it did so for a variety of reasons. Encounters with 12 
the Arctic produced markedly different reactions among Westerners alone. Imperial navies and 13 
explorers were interested in the possibility of discovering and utilizing passages to Asia through 14 
the sea ice.35 Whale hunters from Europe and America followed after the discovery of huge 15 
whale populations in and around the Arctic seas. Resource exploitation also became a theme on 16 
land as the fur trade expanded northward in Russia and North America, often following 17 
land-based explorations tied to nation-building projects. Exploitation, trade, settlement, and 18 
exploration were all examples of the various forms of life that emerged from Western encounters 19 
with the Arctic. 20 
For the nation-state, containing this variation in ways that suited national interests was 21 
relatively straightforward as exploitation, trade, settlement, and exploration facilitated and 22 
benefited one another as well as the state. Increased human presence in the North facilitated 23 
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deeper explorations, which in turn had the potential to uncover new routes and resources that 1 
could be exploited for trade and provide the foundations for new settlements. Despite the 2 
different objectives, actors, and sites involved in these cross-territorial activities, the central role 3 
of the nation-state in both facilitating and benefiting from such encounters allowed for this 4 
variation to be viewed by foreign policy practitioners and experts collectively in terms of the 5 
national interest.  6 
However, while Geopolitics may attempt to contain or manage variation, it cannot 7 
prevent it. The unstoppable proliferation of variation that inevitably occurs over time ensures that 8 
life and the earth that constitutes the Arctic are constantly encountering each other in novel ways, 9 
threatening the stability of the Arctic stage-assemblage. Since the beginning of the twentieth 10 
century, the proliferation of variation has increased rapidly. This proliferation is associated with 11 
the acceleration and intensification described earlier of activities that have brought the Arctic 12 
stage-assemblage into more frequent encounters with both humans and nonhumans. Over the 13 
past century, as more interest has developed in the Arctic, the environment has changed and new 14 
technologies and ideas have been deployed. The region has been physically transformed, through 15 
encounters with different actors, into a variety of cross-cutting stages for resource exploitation—16 
shipping; tourism; indigenous life; monitoring climate change; environmental stewardship; and 17 
military-strategic operations, tests, and exercises. Pollution, development, and changes in the 18 
atmosphere and oceans both in and beyond the Arctic have further contributed to the physical 19 
transformation of the Arctic stage-assemblage. This in turn has facilitated novel encounters with 20 
forms of life keen to explore, exploit, manage, preserve, and ultimately capitalize on the 21 
changing qualities of the stage-assemblage to support various interests. Geopolitics has therefore 22 
also been precariously balanced on an ability to manage excesses of variation (as well as time) in 23 
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ways that allow the overall stability of the Arctic stage-assemblage to be sustained in spite of 1 
constant encounters with difference, for example, by continuing to emphasize the central role of 2 
national territory and sovereignty and the essential laws of the international system while at the 3 
same time suppressing, ignoring, and forgetting the variation that exists among different interest 4 
groups.  5 
Relations between Self and Other 6 
The variation described in the previous section propels Arctic earth into a multitude of different 7 
encounters with life. In attempting to account for these differences, distinctions between “self” 8 
and “other” or “us” and “them” begin to emerge. The elaboration of these differences poses a 9 
number of challenges to Geopolitics: Specifically, how do self and other interact and how should 10 
this relationship be managed? While the Arctic stage-assemblage does not determine the 11 
formation of self and others—or relations between them (and thus my argument should not be 12 
confused with geographical determinism)—it does condition the kinds of encounters that can 13 
occur. For example, the disappearance of summertime sea ice in the Arctic affects how both 14 
humans and animals encounter the Arctic and other kinds of life in the region. This is the Arctic 15 
at its most stage-like. With Geopolitics, foreign policy practitioners and experts attempt to 16 
structure relations between the self and other by claiming knowledge of the essential nature of 17 
these relations, often in ways “which privilege the bodies and activities of some at the expense of 18 
others.”36 Through discourse, practice, and performance, these practitioners and experts attempt 19 
to fix in place and manage relations between the elements that constitute not just the 20 
stage-assemblage, but also life on that stage. However, as with the forces of time and variation, 21 
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uncontrolled relations among different elements always threaten to go beyond established 1 
geopolitical tropes centered on interstate relations and the rules that govern them. 2 
In the Arctic, relations between the West and the Arctic have changed considerably over 3 
the centuries since European explorers first sought to navigate passageways through the sea ice. 4 
The Arctic is implicated in these changes to the extent that it has been enrolled in different ways 5 
to provide the stage on which encounters between self and other have been elaborated. By way 6 
of example, three prominent (if oversimplified) accounts of the Arctic stage-assemblage have 7 
been particularly important to how relations between the West and the Arctic are constructed and 8 
managed in the early twenty-first century. The first has cast the Arctic as a resource base, 9 
primarily in terms of its potential offshore hydrocarbon deposits, which are only just starting to 10 
be tapped.37 As a resource base, the Arctic has been used by some commentators as a stage for 11 
competition among nation-states. Encounters among nation-states have subsequently been 12 
elaborated in terms of a zero-sum free-for-all competition over access to resources. In the 13 
second, the Arctic provides the stage for international scientific cooperation. This has facilitated 14 
a very different kind of encounter between nation-states based on collaboration and seemingly 15 
universal common interest where self and other are engaged in positive-sum cooperation. The 16 
third account of the Arctic stems from the Cold War. The Arctic is presented as the stage for 17 
interstate conflict, a military-strategic theater where the qualities of the Arctic stage-assemblage 18 
are felt in terms of their implications for military installations, operations, and exercises. 19 
Encounters between nation-states on opposing sides tend to be characterized by displays of 20 
power and acts of secrecy by the self, while the other is treated with suspicion and fear. 21 
These various accounts of the Arctic as a stage for encounters between self and other 22 
illustrate how, as in the case of Heidegger’s Greek Temple, the Arctic has in different ways been 23 
19 
 
presented as a familiar, if not taken-for-granted structure that foreign policy practitioners and 1 
experts confidently know their way around. The various elements and relations that comprise the 2 
stage-assemblage disappear from view, and what remains becomes the paradigm through which 3 
to understand Arctic affairs, rendering visible some actors, voices, relations, and features while 4 
suppressing others. However, by drawing attention to the excesses produced by geopower (time, 5 
variation, relations), it is possible to foreground the elements and relations that comprise the 6 
stage-assemblage. In doing so, we find that although these elements and relations have been used 7 
in specific ways to create the stage for the elaboration of a geopolitical discourse, they have not 8 
been used up; they are only partially realized.38 The stage-assemblage therefore cannot be taken 9 
for granted, since it is constantly being undermined by geopower. The constant provocation 10 
posed by geopower creates a space and an opportunity for elaborating the stage-assemblage (and 11 
relations on it) in different terms. And since the physical material that comprises this stage is 12 
only ever partially realized, it matters to the possibilities of assembling a stage (and the 13 
possibilities of life on it) whether this material, or earth, is in the case of the Greek Temple, 14 
marble or plastic, or in the case of the Arctic, whether there is sea ice, open water, tundra, or 15 
permafrost. 16 
Containing Geopower 17 
Containing the excesses of geopower (time, variation, relations) has always been at the core of 18 
writing a geopolitics that reifies enduring features of the geographical landscape as the basis for 19 
the geopolitical stage. Geopolitics has helped produce a stable picture of Arctic history in the 20 
West that is regularly used by foreign policy practitioners and experts to reinforce ideas of 21 
change in present while suppressing the considerable amount of variation that has gone on over 22 
20 
 
time, including, for example, in the extent and thickness of sea ice; in the ecosystem (for 1 
example, species collapse and migration); in indigenous habitation and use of the Arctic; and in 2 
motivations for different kinds of nation-state activity. However, since encounters between earth 3 
and life cannot be repeated, the only way that the stage-assemblage can be stabilized is by 4 
sustaining the outcomes of specific encounters (reduced to their lowest common denominator 5 
such as the national interest) through some form of collective or institutional structure or legal 6 
regime (the nation-state, international law, academic institutions, the media), which is then used 7 
to discipline further encounters between earth and life so that they appear to produce the same 8 
outcome each time. In trying to fix the Arctic as a specific kind of geopolitical stage (through 9 
discourse, practice, and performance), Geopolitics thus works to suppress the provocations of 10 
geopower described above.  11 
Consequently, there is a politics to how the Arctic is encountered, organized, mapped, 12 
and used to facilitate certain kinds of life at the expense of others that have been used, for 13 
example, by nation-states to forcibly relocate indigenous peoples, or, in the case of the European 14 
Union, to impose restrictions on certain economic activities linked to sealing. To presuppose a 15 
natural order to these encounters is to hide the technical labor as well as the provocations that 16 
this labor has had to overcome, involved in establishing the Arctic as a specific kind of stage for 17 
specific kinds of life. Alternative possibilities for life are closed down in the process. However, it 18 
is more than likely that over the coming years, there will be yet more novel encounters between 19 
earth and life as new elements emerge and arrive in the Arctic and old ones dissipate. 20 
This, Grosz argues, is the challenge that all cultures (geopolitical or otherwise) are 21 
presented with in the face of geopower.39 Grosz has developed Darwin's work on the struggle for 22 
existence in nature to show that all culture is engaged in a similar struggle. When the boundaries 23 
21 
 
of a culture, in this case Geopolitics, are exceeded, the only way to survive is through 1 
self-transformation: the adoption of “ever more viable and successful strategies” for containing 2 
geopower, which over time may leave a geopolitical culture completely unrecognizable from 3 
itself.40 The success of Geopolitics is therefore only ever provisional, dependent on an ability to 4 
cohere in spite of internal tensions brought about by the suppression of geopower.41 It is this 5 
ability to still cohere that allows Geopolitics to arrest geopower and stabilize the geopolitical 6 
stage over the longue durée—by accommodating variation and change without exposing it. 7 
However, when the tension becomes too great, the only way Geopolitics can survive is through a 8 
self-transformation capable of providing new solutions to the problem of geopower.  9 
Conclusion 10 
If we take geopower seriously, it should become evident that as life and earth in the Arctic 11 
continue to encounter one another in novel ways, our experiences of geopower—of time, 12 
variation, and relations between selves and others—in the Arctic should be provoking us to 13 
consider the possibility of alternative solutions to how the Arctic is set up as a stage and how 14 
encounters between different forms of life on that stage are elaborated. This chapter has sought 15 
to reconceptualize geopolitics as an attempt to arrest geopower and subordinate it to the power of 16 
people or seemingly enduring geographical features to determine the course of human affairs. An 17 
alternative “geo-politics” has been proposed to place encounters with geopower to the fore of 18 
geopolitical analysis. Three forms of geopower have been considered (time, variation, and 19 
relations), and each has been shown to be provocative to the extent that they provide a constant 20 
pressure to the kinds of stage-assemblages established through geopolitical discourses, practices, 21 
and performances. “Geo-politics” should be understood as an attempt to manage and contain this 22 
22 
 
pressure: a provisional solution that allows for a geopolitical discourse to be asserted in spite of 1 
the fact that earth and life are constantly encountering one another in novel ways. 2 
To this end, geopolitics/geo-politics might fruitfully be conceived as what Grosz calls a 3 
“style of living” that prompts “innovation and ingenuity” in response to the “endless generation 4 
of problems” geopower creates in order that a stage-assemblage (and relations on it) can be 5 
constructed, constrained, and capitalized upon.42 Geopolitics therefore leads to the suppression of 6 
the ways in which the Arctic has varied over time (for example, in terms of the extent to which 7 
sea ice has been a persistent feature) and across space (for example, that sea ice is thicker in 8 
some parts of the Arctic, making those parts less accessible than others), as well as suppressing 9 
and constraining the variety of ways in which the Arctic has been encountered and experienced, 10 
usually to the detriment of indigenous cultures and local knowledge. What is left is a simplistic 11 
constitution of the Arctic as an imagined stage, dominated by the presence and interests of states, 12 
relations between which tend toward conflict or cooperation depending on the volume of sea ice 13 
present (as measured by satellite) or the strength of international institutions or legal regimes.  14 
To the extent that our understanding of geopolitics as a style of living means foreign 15 
policy choices and limits are rooted in knowledge of earth and life, the means we use to acquire 16 
this knowledge matters whether it occurs through direct encounters with the Arctic or forms of 17 
what the political geographer Anssi Paasi has called “geopolitical remote sensing” from afar.43 18 
Earth and life constitute fields of technical uncertainty that must be brought under control if they 19 
are to be made useful. Geopolitics therefore emerges as a technical solution to the problem of 20 
containing geopower and building negentropic structures that are then used to inform and 21 
legitimate foreign policy. Competing assemblages of the Arctic emerge because every encounter 22 
between life and the Arctic is a historically and geographically localizable response to 23 
23 
 
uncertainty, the elaboration of which relies on what is encountered, modes of technological 1 
development, and the human imagination. Throughout history, indigenous cultures, nation-states, 2 
international institutions, and nonstate actors have all produced very different accounts of their 3 
encounters with the Arctic.  4 
At the same time, by conceiving of geopolitics as a style of living, we might recognize 5 
the imperative for Critical Geopolitics to not only deconstruct Geopolitics, but also to chart 6 
alternatives for different ways of seeing the world. There is obviously a need to generate 7 
knowledge from past encounters and experiences in order to help us understand the present and 8 
guide policy decisions about the future. However, it is important that we do not fall into the trap 9 
of forgetting that other possibilities, including ones that may not have been encountered before, 10 
could exist. It is in these alternatives, in novel encounters with the only-ever-partially realized 11 
materiality of the earth, that we might find a valuable political resource for interrogating other 12 
ways of imagining the Arctic, facilitate the elaboration of alternative accounts and experiences, 13 
and seriously begin to question what kind of taken-for-granted stage is being constituted in the 14 
Arctic (including the various roles and relations of those who occupy it). Foregrounding the 15 
stage in this way might just provide a new basis for displacing dominant geopolitical scripts and 16 
start a more dynamic and, ultimately, more positive set of discussions about the future of 17 
political, economic, legal, social, and cultural activities in the Arctic.  18 
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